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Abstract
We show that rms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in nancial expertise, and
that these investments can be destabilizing. Financial expertise in our model improves rms' ability
to accurately estimate value when responding to oers to buy or sell a security. Its presence creates
adverse selection, but under normal circumstances this adverse selection works to the advantage
of the expert. It deters opportunistic bargaining by counterparties. That advantage is neutralized
in equilibrium, however, by osetting investments competitors make. Moreover, when volatility
rises the adverse selection created by expertise triggers breakdowns in liquidity, destroying gains to
trade and thus the benets that rms hope to gain through high levels of expertise.1 Introduction
The nancial sector attracts extremely qualied workers. Philippon and Reshef (2010) document
that, when compared to other sectors of the economy, the growth in nancial services in recent
decades has been associated with increases in employees' academic education, task complexity, and
compensation. This investment in nancial expertise no doubt facilitates a range of important
and productive roles nancial intermediaries serve in modern economies. These include improving
risk sharing, overcoming frictions that interfere with ecient trade, better risk management, and
engineering securities that allow new clienteles to access capital markets.
Our paper points to incentives nancial rms have to overinvest in nancial expertise and
suggests these investments can have a destabilizing eect on nancial markets. We develop a
model in which the acquisition of expertise by nancial rms, such as hiring Ph.D. graduates to
design and value nancial instruments of ever increasing complexity, becomes an \arms race." By
this phrase we mean three things:
 Investment in nancial expertise confers an advantage on any one player (rm) when bar-
gaining with counterparties in the trading process.
 This advantage is neutralized in equilibrium by osetting investments made by competitors.
 Investment in nancial expertise is destabilizing, in that it creates a risk of destruction of the
gains to trade when there is an exogenous shock to the level of uncertainty in the economy.
In the model, traders (or nancial intermediaries generally) acquire expertise in processing
information about the values of assets traded. The resulting eciency in acquiring information
gives them an advantage in subsequent bargaining with competitors. Firms invest in expertise to
the point where any additional investment would lead to breakdowns in trade because of adverse
selection problems. We show that they will invest to this level even when there is some probability
of a jump in volatility, and that when such a jump occurs levels of expertise that are benign under
normal circumstances impede trade and become destructive of value.
Financial expertise in the model is the ability to acquire more accurate information. This
creates adverse selection. Under circumstances of high volatility in the model this causes trade
1to break down for the usual reasons. Knowing that an intermediary might be better informed
leads others to avoid trading with him because they know they will end up buying only when the
value is low (or selling when it is high). Ironically, however, adverse selection is also the source
of the benets to expertise. Under normal circumstances of lower volatility, knowledge that an
intermediary might be better informed improves the terms of trade for this intermediary. It leads
counterparties to oer the intermediary a price that he is more likely to accept regardless of his
information. This imposes a natural limit on investments in expertise. While nancial expertise
deters opportunistic bargaining, rms do not wish to appear too informed. With too much expertise,
the price concessions required to overcome adverse selection can swamp the gains to trade. The
limits this imposes on optimal levels of expertise, however, are too high for ecient trade to be
sustained under high volatility. Thus, our model contributes to a better understanding of why
nancial crises tend to have their origins in newer sectors of the nancial industry, where highly
specialized expertise is particularly important. It also suggests that the employment of experts
should fall following a jump in uncertainty rises, which might otherwise seem counterintuitive.
With greater uncertainty one might expect more, not less, need for nancial expertise.
Before the recent crisis nancial rms had built extensive capacity devoted to transforming
relatively straight-forward securities, such as residential mortgages and credit-card debt, into com-
plex instruments through securitization. They then created trillions of dollars worth of derivative
contracts based on these asset-backed securities. To facilitate this, nancial rms hired highly
trained and highly compensated experts to design, value, hedge, and trade the complex securities
and derivatives. In this environment, it was arguably more dicult to value the securities being
traded, which in our model gives nancial experts an advantage in trade. Unfortunately, when
housing prices fell and default rates rose, the complexity of the nancial instruments made it ex-
tremely dicult to identify where in the system the riskiest or most impaired liabilities were located.
Estimates for the fundamental value of these nancial instruments became highly uncertain. Of
course, uncertainty per se does not interfere with trade, as long as the uncertainty is symmetric.
As our model illustrates, however, when rms acquire high levels of nancial expertise increases in
uncertainty can exacerbate the importance of asymmetric information. The very expertise rms
2had developed may have worked against them in the crises. Their advantage in valuing securities
may have increased the asymmetric information they faced in dealing with relatively uninformed
parties, who were in a position to take the opposite side of their trades and supply liquidity. Our
model provides an explanation for the sudden unwillingness of so many nancial intermediaries to
trade with each other, despite the apparent gains to trade. The model also explains why nancial
intermediaries, whose business it is to facilitate or intermediate trade, would voluntarily acquire
expertise, knowing it has the potential to create adverse selection that can impede trade, and thus
destroy their business. Of course, it seems quite clear to most observers that the nancial rms
with the most experts were, along with many non-experts, surprised and mystied by what was
going on as the nancial crisis unfolded. This is consistent with our model. When uncertainty rises
in the model, the experts know less about underlying values than previously, but the importance
of their relative advantage over others increases, and adverse selection disrupts trade.
In the main version of our model, the asset traded has an uncertain common, or intrinsic
value. One of the two parties also ascribes private benets to the asset, which creates known
and exogenous gains to trade. Financial expertise, and the information experts acquire, reduce
uncertainty about the common value when bargaining. Thus, expertise is assumed to have no
intrinsic social value. Further, rms do not use the information their expertise obtains for them in
equilibrium. The threat to use it ensures they get a better price, which renders their information
superuous. Our assumption that nancial expertise serves no broader purpose is not made in the
interests of realism. Rather, it is intended to highlight a particular set of incentives and tensions
that are likely to be particularly important in an industry where much of the competition is of a
zero-sum nature. Similarly, we do not mean to imply that highly trained and compensated nancial
professionals literally \do nothing useful" for their pay. Rather, these arguments illustrate that part
of their value to their rms, and thus part of their compensation, is due to their ability to deter
others from opportunistic behavior. From a social perspective, nancial experts might be viewed
as overqualied for the routine activities associated with their work. By analogy, hiring the most
highly paid divorce lawyers confers on any one party a huge unilateral advantage in bargaining, but
if both parties hire similar lawyers they might well neutralize each other's impact on the division
3of their clients' assets. In equilibrium, the tasks they perform might be performed as competently
by lawyers with less experience, expertise, and reputation who would charge less, but those lawyers
would not serve to deter the other party's more expensive and experienced counsel.
In most models with adverse selection in nance, some party is exogenously asymmetrically
informed.1 If they could (publicly) avoid becoming informed, they would do so. For example, in
the classic setting described in Myers and Majluf (1984), an owner-manager-entrepreneur wishes to
nance investment in a new project by selling securities to outsiders who know less about the intrin-
sic value of his existing assets than he does. The positive Net Present Value of this new investment
is common knowledge. The entrepreneur is assumed to have acquired his information through his
past history managing the rm. This informational advantage, however, is an impediment to the
entrepreneur in dealing with the nancial markets, as it costs him gains to trade associated with
the NPV of the new investment. If he could manage the rm's assets eectively without acquiring
this information, he would do so in order to minimize frictions associated with nancing.
Given the obvious value of precommitting not to acquire information, why do we see nancial
rms, whose major business is to intermediate and facilitate trading, investing vast resources in
expertise that speeds and improves their ability to acquire and process information about the
assets they trade? In our model, the acquisition of expertise becomes a prisoner's dilemma. It
confers upon any one party an advantage in bargaining that protects him from opportunism by his
counterparties. Looking forward, rms invest in expertise in anticipation of this advantage, but
investments by other rms neutralize the advantage in equilibrium. Under normal circumstances
these investments are wasteful, but they do not interfere with ecient trade. The problem occurs if
uncertainty about asset values jumps, and rms cannot immediately adjust their levels of expertise.
At that point the adverse selection becomes too severe for ecient trade to be sustained.
To keep the analysis tractable, we model agents who are ex ante identical in terms of their
ability to acquire expertise. We model competition between equals. The benets expertise confers
on a trader, however, and the limits to the acquisition of expertise the model articulates, still apply
when some potential counterparties are uninformed or \noise traders."
1See the pioneering paper by Akerlof (1970) on adverse selection and more recent papers on its role in nancial
crises by Eisfeldt (2004), Kirabaeva (2009), Daley and Green (2010), and Kurlat (2010), among many others.
4The model in our paper is naturally interpreted as trading in an over-the-counter market since
trade involves bilateral bargaining rather than intermediation through a specialist or an exchange.
Most of the complex securities associated with high levels of nancial expertise are traded over the
counter|including mortgage- and asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),
credit default swaps (CDSs), currencies, and xed-income products such as treasury, sovereign,
corporate, and municipal debt. Several models of over-the-counter trading have been proposed in
the literature, such as Due, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) and Due, Garleanu and Pedersen
(2007). In these models search frictions and relative bargaining power are the sources of illiquidity.
The search frictions are taken as exogenous. Investments in \expertise" that reduced search frictions
would be welfare enhancing, and would lead to greater gains to trade. In contrast, adverse selection
is the central friction in our model. Investments in expertise do not improve eciency, and they
put gains to trade at risk.
Other models such as Carlin (2009) and Carlin and Manso (2010) view nancial complexity as
increasing costs to counterparties. In these two papers, however, the nancial intermediary directly
manipulates search costs to consumers, so these costs are most naturally interpreted as hidden fees
for mutual funds, bank accounts, credit cards, and other consumer nancial products. We interpret
nancial expertise as a relative advantage in verifying the value of a common-value nancial asset
in an environment where the complexity of the security, or the opacity of the trading venue, makes
this costly. That is, we take the complexity of valuation as given, and treat expertise as investment
in talent and infrastructure that improves the speed, eciency, or accuracy of ascertaining that
value, rather than as the intentional obfuscation of useful information. Both forces could be at work
in the nancial industry, since the complexity of valuation and the transparency of information are
clearly related.
Economists since Hirshleifer (1971) have recognized that in a competitive equilibrium, private
incentives may lead agents to overinvest in information gathering activities that have redistributive
consequences but no social value. Our model captures, in addition, the potential these investments
have to create adverse selection, and thus destroy value beyond the resources invested directly in
acquiring information.
5The general notion that economic actors may overinvest in professional services that help them
compete in a zero-sum game goes back at least to Ashenfelter and Bloom (1993), which empirically
studies labor arbitration hearings and argues that outcomes are unaected by legal representation,
as long as both parties have lawyers. A party that is not represented, when his or her opponent has
a lawyer, suers from a signicant disadvantage. In this setting, however, the investment in legal
services is not destructive of value beyond the fees paid to the lawyers. In our setting, expertise in
nance has the potential to cause breakdowns in trade since it creates adverse selection.
Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) draw parallels between legal and -
nancial services in arguing that countries with large service sectors devoted to such \rent-seeking"
activities grow less quickly than economies where talented individuals are attracted to more en-
trepreneurial careers. They do not directly model the source of rent extraction, as we do.
Other papers such as Hauswald and Marquez (2006), Fishman and Parker (2010), Van Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp (2010), and Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011) propose settings in which
banks and investors can overinvest in information acquisition, as they do in our model. The banks
in Hauswald and Marquez (2006) acquire information about the credit worthiness of borrowers
because it softens price competition between banks that compete for market shares whereas in-
vestors in Fishman and Parker (2010) acquire information about the value of multiple projects
before choosing which ones to nance. Information can, however, be socially useful in both of
these settings in eciently allocating capital. Investors in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010)
allocate their information acquisition resources across nancial assets and make portfolio decision
simultaneously. Investors tend to focus their information acquisition on a small set of assets they
expect to include in their portfolio, leading to the appearance of portfolio underdiversication.
Closer to our paper, Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011) model a labor market for workers who
can choose to become entrepreneurs or nanciers. Compared to the social optimum, too many
workers become nanciers as workers do not account for the negative externality that informed
screening by nanciers has on the bargaining power of entrepreneurs, who are all assumed to be
uninformed. We model the interaction between nancial intermediaries in their role as traders,
where more expertise facilitates the (inecient) acquisition of information about the assets to be
6traded and consequently improves bargaining positions.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model of trading inter-
actions in its simplest form. Section 3 considers the decision to invest in nancial expertise. In
Section 4 we prove our main results, which illustrate the destabilizing eects of expertise. Section 5
uses a parametric example in a multiperiod setting to illustrate some of the features of the model.
Section 6 studies how allowing for revenues unrelated to OTC trading but increasing in expertise
aects the model's implications. In Section 7 we study the signalling game that arises when both
parties to any one trading encounter come with private information obtained through nancial
expertise. We show that the central tradeos from our basic model survive in a pooling equilibria
based on credible o-equilibrium beliefs, where play proceeds much as in the simpler case. Section
8 concludes.
2 Financial Expertise as a Deterrent
In our model nancial expertise is the ability to eciently and accurately process information about
a nancial asset under time pressure in response to an oer to trade. It can be viewed as both
human capital and technological infrastructure that supports it. Again, we emphasize that it is
likely nancial expertise has other roles and benets to the rms that employ experts. We highlight
this particular one here to show how it leads to incentives to overinvest in expertise that can be
destabilizing.
This section develops a simple bargaining model that illustrates how expertise protects a trader
from opportunistic bargaining by his counterparties, and results in more favorable terms of trade
even though the information acquired through expertise is not used in equilibrium. It simply acts
as a threat or deterrent. We begin with a very simple setting to illustrate the intuition. At the end
of the section, we discuss which aspects of the problem are without loss of generality, and which
will be addressed in later sections of the paper. The bargaining game here will, in later sections,
be a subgame in a model that endogenizes the choice of expertise. For the moment, the levels of
expertise the players bring to the bargaining process are taken as given.
Two risk-neutral traders, denoted i and j, come together to exchange a nancial asset. The
7asset has both a common value component, v, and a private value component. One of the two
parties is assigned the role of buyer, and we will assume for the moment that this is agent j. Agent
i is the seller. The buyer's valuation of the asset is v + 2, while the seller's valuation is simply
the common value v. The private value component, , is the source of gains to trade. Without it,
trade would break down in this setting due to the standard \no-trade theorem." The private value
could be viewed as a hedging need, unique access to a customer who is willing to overpay for the
asset, or any other source of value that is not shared by all parties. The gains to trade are common
knowledge to both parties, but there is uncertainty about the common value. It is either high,
vh, or low, vl, with equal probability. Notice that vh   vl is a natural measure of the amount of
uncertainty, or volatility, in this setting. It will play an important role in bounding the equilibrium
levels of expertise, and unexpected jumps in this quantity are the source of the destabilizing eects
of expertise that we explore in Section 4.
We give the buyer all the bargaining power in an ultimatum game. He makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oer to buy the asset at a price p. We assume, at this point, that the buyer is uninformed
about the value, v, and views the two possible outcomes as equally probable. This dramatically
simplies the analysis, while still allowing us to illustrate the central tradeos, because it eliminates
the complications that arise when the rst mover in the game is privately informed, creating a
signalling game. We study the more general case in Section 7 and argue that the intuition we
develop for the one-sided case survives in a robust class of equilibria.
The seller can use his expertise to obtain information about the asset's value before responding
to the buyer's oer. Specically, he receives a signal, si 2 fH;Lg, that the value of the asset is
vh or vl. The accuracy of the signal depends on expertise. Specically, the probability that his
signal is correct is i = 1
2 + ei, where ei 2 [0; 1
2] denotes his expertise. The expertise is the result
of investments made at an earlier stage of the game, described in the next section.
Suppose the seller's signal is uninformative (ei = 0 and i = 1
2). Then we have an ultimatum
game with symmetric information. The buyer oers p = E(v), the lowest price the seller will accept.
The buyer captures the entire surplus of 2, and the seller earns no surplus. Trade always takes
place in equilibrium, and the agent with the higher valuation always ends up with the asset|there
8is eciency in allocations.
How does expertise, ei > 0, help the agent responding to an oer in this game? If he is oered
the unconditional value he will turn down that price whenever his signal is high. The gains to trade
are then lost half the time, and at p = E(v) the buyer is overpaying whenever trade does occur
because he knows the seller has seen a low signal when he accepts.
The buyer, of course, will anticipate this. One possible response would be to oer the lowest
price he can, given that the seller will walk away unless he has a low signal. This price is the seller's
valuation, given a low signal:
p = E(v j si = L)
= (1   i)vh + ivl; (1)
At this price, trade breaks down whenever the seller gets a high signal. The seller receives zero
expected surplus, and the buyer captures the gains to trade with probability one half, for an
expected surplus of .
An alternative for the buyer is to oer a price higher than the unconditional expectation, in
hopes that the seller will accept regardless of his signal. The lowest price at which the seller will
always accept will be:
p = E(v j si = H)
= ivh + (1   i)vl: (2)
If the buyer oers the higher price, p, trade always occurs, and the inecient loss of gains to
trade is avoided. He must share some of the surplus with the seller, however, to achieve this. The
buyer's expected surplus is
E(v) + 2   p = 2   (vh   vl)

i  
1
2

= 2   (vh   vl)ei: (3)
9The seller's expected surplus at this price (unconditionally, across both possible realizations of his
signal) is
E[p   E(v j si)] = p   E(v)
= (vh   vl)(i  
1
2
) (4)
= (vh   vl)ei:
Thus, the seller's expertise allows him to extract a higher price from the buyer in this situation,
even though the seller does not act on his information once the oer is made.
If the buyer oers p, which will only be accepted when the seller has received a low signal, his
expected payo is
1
2
(2 + E(v j si = L)   p) = ; (5)
and the expected surplus for the seller is his reservation price of zero.
It is obvious that p and p are the only candidate equilibrium oers, since the buyer strictly
prefers a lower price, given the probability the seller accepts. The buyer's choice between these two
prices will be the one that yields the higher expected payo to him. Comparing (5) and (3), he
will oer the higher price p if
2   (vh   vl)ei   (6)
or if
ei 

vh   vl
: (7)
Remarks: The tradeos from the buyer's perspective in this model are straightforward. If he
pays a higher price, he preserves gains to trade but he must share some of those gains with the
liquidity provider. As is evident in equations (3) and (4) the \bribe" the buyer must pay to keep
the seller from responding to his information is increasing in the accuracy of that information|in
his nancial expertise. This drives the arms race in our model. If the seller's level of expertise is
too high, however, condition (7) tells us that the buyer will switch to a lower oer at which the
seller earns no surplus and trade breaks down half the time due to adverse selection. This limits
10the arms race. The bound on expertise tightens if volatility, vh   vl, rises relative to the gains
to trade, . Therefore, investments in expertise that still allow for ecient trade under normal
circumstances might inhibit trade and destroy value when volatility is abnormally high.
Note that the higher the seller's expertise, the higher the price required to keep him from using
his information in responding to an oer, but given that he gets such an oer, the information
in his signal is superuous. In this sense, his expertise is not actually used in equilibrium aside
from its role as a deterrent as long as ei   e. Above that boundary the eects of adverse selection
outweigh the gains to trade, and liquidity breaks down.
The appendix shows that exactly analogous expressions to those above hold when the rst mover
is a seller, and the buyer observes a signal before accepting or rejecting the oer. The same bound
on expertise, (7), ensures ecient trade takes place in the trading game. The only dierence is that
the price required to ensure trade always takes place is the buyer's valuation given a low signal.
Thus, the same conditions on expertise must hold under a variety of protocols. We can assume
nature randomly assigns one agent to be the buyer and one to be the seller, and then the buyer
always makes the ultimatum oer, or we can assume nature randomly assigns the opportunity to
make the oer to either the buyer or the seller. What is important for the subsequent analysis is
that at the point where agents invest in expertise, they are uncertain about whether they will be
making an oer or responding to it. It is natural to think of the responder as a supplier of liquidity
to the proposer, who needs liquidity because of some external opportunity or imperative. We can
think, then, of intermediaries engaged in trading nancial assets as sometimes in need of liquidity
and sometimes being called upon to supply it on short notice.
In the game we have described to this point, traders are bargaining over a xed surplus of 2,
and the only role of expertise is to increase their share of this surplus. Thus, we are assuming
expertise has no social value, not proving it. We do this to highlight the incentives nancial
intermediaries who are engaged in this type of trading have to overinvest in nancial expertise
by showing they do so even when it has no social value. In the actual economy, as opposed to in
our abstract model, nancial expertise surely does have social value. It is easy to imagine ways in
which the gains to trade in our model, , might be enhanced through nancial expertise. Greater
11expertise in search could help match higher value buyers with lower value sellers. Better nancial
engineering could assist in identifying opportunities to more eciently share risk or to avoid taxes.
The ability to bring information to trading decisions quickly could improve price eciency and
in this way lead to better coordinated investment and operating decisions by rms. Still, if the
incentives we highlight are present along with these benets of expertise, one would expect excessive
investment in expertise by rms, and, as we will go on to show, this investment will be destabilizing.
Section 6 provides a simple generalization of our model that shows how the incentives we study
can coexist with other benets of expertise.
We have modeled a game where intermediaries with expertise are trading with other interme-
diaries with expertise. In actual nancial markets much of their trade is surely with uninformed
non-experts|what nancial models often refer to as \noise traders." Note that the model of the
trading process to this point highlights the value of expertise even when dealing with inexpert coun-
terparties. The threat implicit in the expert's knowledge ensures price concessions when responding
to an oer from an uninformed trader seeking liquidity. Of course, in the model the incentives to
acquire expertise are symmetric, but it is easy to imagine that for some market participants their
infrequent needs to trade in complex securities requiring expertise to evaluate would mean the
marginal costs of additional investment would lead them to acquire much lower levels of expertise.
One way to think of the gains to trade in our model is that it ultimately derives from such
noise traders. An intermediary identies a third party with inelastic demand or an urgent need to
trade, and then seeks liquidity from another intermediary in order to meet that third party's needs.
Obviously, nancial intermediaries trading in OTC markets would prefer to obtain liquidity from
naive noise traders when they can, rather than from sophisticated counterparties they know will
drive a harder bargain. As long as there are some times when they must resort to trading with each
other when seeking or supplying liquidity, however, the deterrent role of expertise we highlight will
be relevant. Hedge funds, trading desks of Wall Street rms, and institutional investors all have
incentives to build expertise to deter aggressive bargaining by counterparties.
More broadly, this trading game is a relatively simple mechanism, in which the consequences
of adverse selection are stark and straightforward to characterize. We can then highlight the
12tradeo between bargaining power gained with expertise and the increased risk of illiquidity. The
eects adverse selection has on trading outcomes in this setting, however, are similar to those
in more complex and general mechanisms. Trade \breaks down" when parties bargaining are
asymmetrically informed about valuations, even if it is common knowledge that there are gains
to trade. For example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) demonstrate that no bilateral trading
mechanism (without external subsidies) achieves ecient ex-post outcomes. Incentive-compatible
individually-rational mechanisms involve mixed strategies that with non-zero probability lead to
inecient allocations. Samuelson (1984) shows that when only the responder is informed, exchange
occurs if and only if the proposer can successfully make a take-it-or-leave it oer, as we assume
he can in our model. Admati and Perry (1987) show in pure-strategy bargaining games that
asymmetric information results in costly delays in bargaining. Thus, illiquidity, or the loss of
gains to trade in some circumstances, is a general feature of bilateral exchange mechanisms with
asymmetric information. It is in no way unique to our setting.
3 Investing in Expertise
It is evident from the previous section that if all traders come to the bargaining process with
expertise below the bound  e  
vh vl then trade is ecient: it takes place with probability one
and the party with the higher value obtains the asset. In this section we consider the equilibrium
choices of expertise, and provide conditions under which the unique equilibrium involves all traders
investing up to this boundary. An arms race occurs. In the next section, we will allow the volatility
to vary stochastically, and show that the same levels of expertise are still the equilibrium. As a
result, when volatility rises suddenly, liquidity breaks down.
We now treat the trading game described above as a second stage in a two-stage game. In the
rst stage traders acquire expertise. The cost of resources that must be invested initially to attain
expertise of ei is c(ei). We assume this cost is positive, twice continuously dierentiable, convex,
and monotonically increasing (c0(e) > 0;c00(e) > 0). At the point where they invest in expertise,
agents are uncertain about their role in the trading subgame|whether they will be buying or
selling, proposing a price or responding to an oer. This is intended to capture the notion that
13rms routinely engaged in trading in nancial markets are at times seeking liquidity and at other
times able to supply it. At times they have a (potential) bargaining advantage, and at other times
they must respond quickly to oers from others, which puts them at a disadvantage in bargaining.
The previous section showed how expertise can be viewed as a deterrent in the latter situation.
Consider agent's i's best response assuming that his counterparty is agent j, and ej   e = 
vh vl.
Then the analysis in the previous section tells us that agent i's expected payo in any subgame
where he is the buyer (or more generally the proposer) is
2   (vh   vl)ej (8)
and his payo when selling is
(vh   vl)ei (9)
as long as ei   e. Each of these outcomes occurs with probability one-half, so his ex ante expected
payo in such a subgame at the time when he invests in expertise, is, for ei   e,
 +
1
2
(vh   vl)(ei   ej): (10)
Evidently, the eect of a trader's choice of expertise is independent of that of his opponent.
More expertise increases his payo when he is a seller and has no eect on his payo when he
is a buyer. That depends on his opponent's expertise, but in a Nash equilibrium trader i takes
his counterparties' actions as given. His payo increases linearly in his own expertise up to the
boundary  e, where it drops discontinuously because above that point the adverse selection disrupts
trade. If the marginal cost of investment in expertise does not rise too quickly, he will invest to
that point, but then so will agent j, so that the advantage oered by expertise is neutralized in
equilibrium. Whatever bargaining advantage the trader gains as a seller through expertise, he loses
as a buyer to the expertise of his counterparty. Trade is ecient, and the expected surplus earned
by any trader ex-ante is , half the total gains to trade. The only destruction of value due to
expertise is the wasted resources of c( e) for each trader.
14The conditions on the cost function that ensure a symmetric equilibrium at the upper boundary
are straightforward. The expected payo for agent i in any given trading encounter, assuming his
counterparty is agent j, is:
1
2
ei(vh   vl)I

ei 

(vh   vl)

+
1
2

 + (   ej(vh   vl))I

ej 

(vh   vl)

; (11)
where I() is an indicator function. The rst term represents the expected payo for agent i when
he is a responder, which occurs with probability 1
2, and the second term represents his expected
payo when he is a proposer. As is obvious from the equation, his choice of ei will be independent
of his counterparty's choice of expertise, ej;j 6= i. Hence, agent i's optimal investment in expertise
will maximize:
1
2
ei(vh   vl)I

ei 

(vh   vl)

  c(ei): (12)
Assuming, as we do, that all agents face the same cost function c(), all agents acquire  e of
expertise if c0( e)  1
2(vh   vl). Otherwise all agents acquire ^ e, the level of expertise that satises:
c0(^ e) =
1
2
(vh   vl); (13)
which is the rst-order condition of equation (12). Furthermore, the strict convexity of the cost
function ensures that no other expertise level can provide agent i with the same payo as  e or ^ e,
hence no mixed strategy equilibria will exist either. Therefore, the equilibrium is unique.
Remarks: We describe the competition to accumulate expertise as an \arms race" because, as
in the military setting, there is a unilateral incentive for each agent to acquire expertise in order
to enforce better bargaining outcomes, but these advantages are neutralized in equilibrium by o-
setting investments by the other agents. In the basic setting that we have described thus far, the
marginal benets of additional expertise do not depend on the opponents' expertise. In most mili-
tary situations, this would not be the case. There, any one state's incentives to acquire additional
arms falls once it has an arsenal suciently superior to its opponents to dictate outcomes. The
benets of additional expertise do interact with the opponents level of expertise in the model with
15two-sided private information we develop in Section 7, and in this respect it might be viewed as
more closely conforming to an \arms race" in the classic sense.
4 The Destabilizing Eects of Expertise
To this point, we have considered only a setting where investments in expertise are wasteful, but
have no consequences for trade or market liquidity. This is analogous to an arms race that achieves
mutual deterrence, and never leads to a war.
Consider, however, that the bound on expertise that ensures ecient trade in the bargaining
subgame is decreasing in vh   vl. Suppose rms invest in expertise in anticipation of the benets
to them under normal circumstances of relatively low volatility. Then, any jump in volatility will
lead to breakdowns in trade or illiquidity due to adverse selection, if rms cannot costlessly and
immediately adjust their expertise in response. We provide conditions in this section under which
this is the equilibrium outcome.
We assume the common values are drawn from two possible regimes, high-volatility and low-
volatility. In the normal, or low-volatility regime, vh  vl = . This regime occurs with probability
1   . The high-volatility regime occurs infrequently, with probability . The two possible values
are then further apart: vh   vl = , where  > 1. Traders know, when they engage in bargaining,
whether they are in the high or the low-volatility regime.
Now, consider the same steps as in the previous section when volatility is stochastic. The
expected periodic payo for agent i in the trading subgame is given by:
1
2

(1   )eiI

ei 



+ eiI

ei 



(14)
+
1
2

 + (1   )(   ej)I

ej 

)

+ (   ej)I

ej 



:
As before, the rst term represents the expected payo for agent i when he is a responder (seller)
and the second term in brackets represents his expected payo when he is a proposer (buyer). The
independence of optimal strategies is again obvious from this expression. The eects of changes in
ei do not depend on ej. Trader i's choice of ei will be independent from his opponent's expertise
16level ej. Hence, agent i's optimal investment in expertise will maximize
1
2

(1   )eiI

ei 



+ eiI

ei 



  c(ei): (15)
When volatility is stochastic, there are four candidates for the equilibrium level of expertise:
1. the highest level of expertise that allows ecient trade in the low-volatility regime:  e  
 ,
2. the highest level of expertise that allows ecient trade in the high-volatility regime:   e  
,
3. the level of expertise that satises the rst-order condition in the low-volatility regime: ^ el
such that,
1
2
(1   ) = c0(^ el); (16)
4. the level of expertise level that satises the rst-order condition in the high-volatility regime:
^ eh such that,
1
2
[(1   ) + ] = c0(^ eh): (17)
The next proposition is our main result for the basic model. It shows that if expertise is relatively
inexpensive (low marginal cost) in comparison to its expected benets in the low-volatility regime,
so that  e is the equilibrium with  = 0, then the continuity of an agent's payo function in  ensures
that all agents acquiring  e in expertise remains the unique equilibrium whenever the high-volatility
regime is suciently unlikely.
Proposition 1 Suppose that
c0




<

2
; (18)
so that  e = 
 is the unique equilibrium with a single, low-volatility regime (i.e., when  = 0). Then,
for any  > 1, there exists a  > 0 such that, for any  < ,  e remains the unique equilibrium in
the choice of expertise.
The upper bound on  is then given by:
 = min
(
1  
2

c0




;
 
1   1


   2

c
 


  c
  


 
2   1



)
: (19)
17Proof: Provided in the appendix.
The intuition behind the proof is that if  is less than the rst term under the minf;g operator
in (19), then the marginal gains from expertise in the low-volatility regime (which now has a lower
probability than one) still exceed the marginal cost of expertise. The convexity of the cost function
then allows us to rule out the two candidate equilibrium levels of expertise associated with the
rst-order conditions holding with equality, and limit the comparison to  e and   e. The second term
under the minf;g operator requires that the probability of the high-volatility regime is suciently
low to ensure that the extra cost of investing the higher level of expertise, c( e)   c(  e), combined
with the expected loss in gains to trade when volatility is high, do not oset the extra benets
associated with gaining a better price when responding to oers under low volatility.
Remarks: Our model predicts that nancial intermediaries might nd it optimal to acquire exper-
tise even though it makes trade fragile in periods of high uncertainty. Acquiring expertise improves
an intermediary's ability to assess an asset's value, and therefore it amplies the possibility of an
adverse-selection problem. The threat of facing a better informed counterparty might force an
intermediary to make him a better oer to ensure that trade takes place, but as volatility goes up
the value of information also goes up and the buyer becomes unable to make an oer that would
be simultaneously viable for him and always accepted by the seller. In the high-volatility regime
trade breaks down whenever the responder observes a high signal, which occurs half of the time.
If the probability of the high-volatility regime is small enough, however, the gains to trade lost
in the high-volatility regime are not as important as the increase in prots that added expertise,
and the ensuing improved bargaining position, bring in the low-volatility regime. The intermediary
nds it optimal to acquire the level of expertise that maximizes his expected prots in the more
probable low-volatility regime, even though it leads to trade breakdowns and therefore lower prots
in the infrequent high-volatility regime. Each nancial rm acts in its own best interests but, in
equilibrium, trade breaks down with an unconditional probability of 
2 and  of the expected
gains to trade are destroyed.
Of course, it is often the case that decisions that are good for one state might be bad for another.
18Similarly, information theorists have long understood that although pooling can be sustained,
despite adverse selection, in settings where the dierences between outcomes are small, trade will
break down when this dierence is large. What is novel in our model is that the degree of adverse
selection is a choice. Both the acquisition of expertise and the limits are endogenous responses. The
benet of becoming informed is that, when called upon to supply liquidity, the supplier's share of the
surplus stemming from his counterparty's private value is increasing in the supplier's expertise. The
cost of becoming too informed is the increasing risk that, as the asymmetric information problem
worsens, the counterparty will only oer the lemons price, which leaves the liquidity supplier with
zero surplus. Large liquidity suppliers might want to appear informed to their counterparties since
the implicit threat improves their bargaining position. This is the mechanisms that motivates the
acquisition of expertise. On the other hand, the same intermediaries might want to avoid appearing
to be too informed relative to their counterparties, or else traders will avoid them. That is the
mechanism that constrains expertise in the model. Facing this tradeo, intermediaries acquire the
capacity to become informed, even though it puts their business at risk.
These tradeos make the relationship between expertise, market instability, and uncertainty
ambiguous, but by considering them we might still gain some insights into why liquidity crises
emerged in particular sectors of the nancial industry. On one hand, high levels of uncertainty,
(vh vl), make expertise more valuable as a threat at the margin, as is apparent from equation (10).
On the other hand, the very power of expertise with higher levels of uncertainty makes the adverse
selection more problematic, so that the bound on the equilibrium level of expertise, in (7), is tighter
with more uncertainty. Note that when uncertainty is low investment in expertise will be limited to
the technological cost of greater investment, captured in the model by the marginal cost condition
(13), and the level of expertise will be below the threshold at which adverse selection interferes
with trade. When this is the case, a jump in volatility must be much larger to trigger a drop in
liquidity. For an arms race in expertise to lead to breakdowns in liquidity, therefore, we must have
two forces at work. Valuation must be suciently complex and uncertain to warrant investments
in expertise to begin with, and to raise the level of investment to the point that liquidity is at risk.
Second, volatility or uncertainty must jump in response to an exogenous shock. Recent nancial
19crises appear to share the required characteristics. For example, the LTCM default and the crisis
in the mortgage-backed and credit default swap markets all involved new strategies, technologies,
or types of securities where the expert knowledge of some traders might have given nancial rms
a big advantage. They also involved surprises that raised uncertainty about intrinsic valuations:
the Russian default and a national fall in housing prices.
In this model, the choice of expertise is made at an initial date, before the volatility state
is known. Our results then highlight the fact that expertise becomes costly for rms when, for
exogenous reasons, volatility increases. In the actual nancial industry, of course, rms can and
do adjust their \expertise" in response to changing conditions, as the layos following the recent
nancial crisis make very clear. The incentives we focus on would presumably survive as long as
there were adjustment costs that would keep rms' response from being complete and instantaneous.
In this respect, the empirical implications of our model stand in marked contrast to other
explanations for the value of nancial expertise. Typically, other views of expertise would imply that
it has greater value when more uncertainty is present. For example, more uncertainty would seem
to create more need to reallocate risk, and greater opportunities for nancial rms to create value
by facilitating this process. Indeed, it is often said that Wall Street \makes money o of volatility."
Yet we consistently see dramatic contractions in hiring and employment of professional employees
in the nancial sector following nancial crises. These are also periods with both abnormally high
volatility and the destruction of liquidity, despite apparent benets to trade and a greater need to
reallocate risk.
Our model oers a way to reconcile these seemly contradictory phenomena. The one theoret-
ically coherent explanation for an unwillingness to trade in periods of high volatility is increased
adverse selection. Our model explains how expertise might exacerbate this problem. At the same
time, the experts in our model do prot from volatility under normal conditions. Without some
uncertainty in our model expertise has no value in trading interactions. Accordingly, in light of
the incentives our model highlights, it should not be surprising that nancial rms build exper-
tise through periods of moderate volatility, knowing this puts their business in jeopardy should
uncertainty suddenly increase, and then contract in response to shocks that raise uncertainty.
20The breakdown in trade triggered by a jump in volatility is due to the increase in the importance
of the liquidity supplier's private information in the presence of more uncertainty. It may seem to
some readers implausible that the liquidity problems we observe during nancial crises could be due
to nancial intermediaries knowing too much, when it appeared to many observers they the large
nancial intermediaries were themselves surprised and mystied by what was happening. Keep in
mind, however, that the experts in our model are more mystied when volatility jumps. There is
more uncertainty in the environment. They are just less mystied than their counterparties.
5 Parameterization
In this section we parameterize our model, in order to better illustrate its implications. The earlier
sections developed the model as a two-stage game with one trading encounter. This illustrates the
central qualitative tradeos, but the model is quantitatively more sensible if we view investments
in expertise as made in anticipation of many trading interactions.
Accordingly, we assume there is a continuum of risk-neutral and innitely-lived nancial inter-
mediaries or traders. In each period t, t = 1;:::;1, trader i meets a random counterparty drawn
from the set of potential traders, and they bargain through the ultimatum game described in earlier
sections. When they meet, agent i is assigned the role of buyer (proposer) or seller (responder)
with equal probability, and his counterparty assumes the other role. Nature then determines the
volatility regime, low with probability 1  or high with probability . This is common knowledge
to the traders. The common value, v, is drawn independently through time. At t = 0 trader i
can invest resources, c(ei), to acquire in nancial expertise ei, which is xed through time. The
expertise is known to all parties at all times. Trading history, however, is anonymous to abstract
from the eects of reputation building and the complications this would create in the game. Thus,
a specic trader knows in any given encounter if he is dealing with a major investment bank or a
municipal pension fund. He does not know the outcomes of his counterparty's recent trades. Future
expected payos are discounted at rate . This setting preserves the simplicity of the two-stage
game, while allowing for more reasonable relative magnitudes of initial investment and periodic
trading prots.
21We specify the cost c(e) of acquiring a level of expertise e as given by c(e) = 
2e2. In this case,
the threshold  becomes:
 = min
(
1   2(1   )

2 ;
 
1   1


  (1   )
 
1   1
2

 
2  
2   1


)
: (20)
Note that both arguments in the minf;g operator are decreasing in 
2 . If, instead, we take  as
given, we can rewrite the two conditions ensuring that  e is the unique equilibrium in expertise as:

2 < min
(
1   
2(1   )
;
1   2  
(1 )

(1   )
 
1   1
2

)
: (21)
Thus, the arms race equilibrium, which of course puts gains to trade at risk, is more likely to
occur when these gains to trade, , are low relative to the routine volatility, . Increasing the cost
of acquiring expertise, , also works against the arms race equilibrium for obvious reasons.
Figure 1 plots the maximum probability for the high-volatility regime, , that supports the
arms-race equilibrium with trade breakdowns as a function of the magnitude of the jump, . The
parameter values used in this gure are  = 1 (base volatility is a free normalization),  = 0:2
(gains to trade),  = 0:9 (discount factor), and  = 10 (marginal cost of acquiring expertise). The
lesson to be drawn from this gure is that the probability of a jump to the high volatility regime,
with a loss of half the gains to trade, can be quite substantial. It ranges from around 5% when the
jump in volatility is 10%, to around 15% when that jump is 50%. The relationship between  and
 is increasing in this gure because a higher  increases the dierential in payos between  e and   e,
in the low volatility regime, at a higher rate than the dierential in costs of expertise. Essentially,
when  increases and the volatility levels in the two regimes get farther from each other, the loss in
prots in the low-volatility regime that goes with lowering expertise to preserve ecient trade in
the high-volatility regime increases. Saving the gains to trade in the high-volatility regime becomes
costlier in terms of bargaining position in the low-volatility regime.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the equilibrium level of expertise and the gains to
trade when we set  = 1:2, and  = 0:05 and  is allowed to vary. When  is small enough for
the inequality in (21) to hold ( < 3:55), the equilibrium level of expertise is equal to  e, which is
22increasing in . Once  becomes large enough, however, and (21) is violated (  3:55), expertise
drops discretely from  e = 
 to   e = 
, which is also increasing in  but at a lower rate.
Intuitively, when gains to trade are small enough relative to the volatility in asset value, inter-
mediaries are willing to acquire high levels of expertise even though this expertise leads to some
trade breakdowns when volatility is high. On the other hand, when gains to trade get larger, the
potential losses due to trade breakdowns become too important and intermediaries prefer to dial
down on expertise to ensure that trade takes place even when volatility is high.
Remarks: Note that to keep the model tractable, and avoid having to deal with an extremely
complicated dynamic game, we have specied that trading is anonymous so that there is no oppor-
tunity for building a reputation. This is clearly an important limitation. Professional participants
in OTC markets surely do dier in the reputations, as well as in the expertise they bring to bear in
their dealings with others. First, we note that there is nothing \disreputable" in what the traders
in our model are doing. They are simply bargaining. In equilibrium, nobody is misled or exploited
on average. It is also not at all clear in which direction allowing for reputation would lead. On one
hand, building a reputation for tough bargaining, even at the risk of losing gains to trade, has a
benet in repeated interactions much like expertise in our model, and would serve to exacerbate
the risk of periodic breakdowns in liquidity. On the other hand, a reputation for fair dealing would
mitigate the need for, and value of, expertise as a deterrent.
6 Other Benets from Financial Expertise
The simple model we analyzed so far focuses on the role of expertise in valuing and trading securities
in an over-the-counter setting. Abstracting away all other benets from nancial expertise yields
stark and intuitive results about the incentives of nancial rms to acquire expertise before trading
with other rms. Of course, in reality nancial expertise has other benets and produces revenues
that are unrelated to trading but that aect rms' decisions to acquire expertise.
So here we assume that, in addition to earning revenues from the trading game we model, a rm
with expertise e earns in each period a revenue r(e) unrelated to trading activities. This revenue
23is assumed to be positive, increasing and weakly concave in expertise and represents, for example,
compensation for investment banking activities or for improving a client's risk-management pro-
cesses. The expected periodic payo for rm i is the payo we had in equation (14) for the simple
model plus r(ei).
Adding other revenues to the benets of expertise makes the acquisition of expertise more
attractive for the nancial rms in our model. Since it is unrelated to trading payos, adding r(e),
where r0(e) > 0, is equivalent to reducing the cost of expertise c(e) by 1
1 r(e). Therefore, the
earlier conditions required for expertise  e to be optimal are easier to satisfy when r(e) enters the
payo function.
The novelty from adding r(e) is that, in some circumstances, rms will not stop at  e when
acquiring expertise. If r(e) increases suciently quickly in the region where e >  e, the unique
equilibrium will then be an arms race in expertise where all rms acquire a level of expertise e e
(>  e) that satises:
1
1   
r0(e e) = c0(e e): (22)
In such settings, the marginal benets of expertise are so high that rms continue to acquire
expertise well past the previous equilibrium level  e even though it implies that trade breaks down
half of the time in the low-volatility regime as well as in the high-volatility regime. The extra
revenues 1
1 [r(e e)   r( e)] from the higher expertise are larger than the expected loss in gains to
trade in the low-volatility regime 1
1  plus the cost savings [c( e) c(e e)]. Hence, rms maximize
their total payo, net of the cost of expertise, by picking the same level of expertise they would
pick if expertise did not aect what happens in the trading game.
To summarize, accounting for other revenues generated by nancial expertise strengthens the
incentives of nancial rms to acquire expertise and breakdowns in trade are then as frequent, if
not more, than in our earlier model without such revenues. Hence, for simplicity, we continue to
abstract away from these revenues in the remaining of the paper.
247 The Signalling Game with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information
In the previous sections we treated nancial expertise as a capacity to accurately assess the value of
an asset under time pressure in response to an oer to trade. We assumed that the intermediaries
or traders use this expertise in their role as liquidity suppliers. The party making the oer to trade
was the source of private benets, but did not receive an informative signal. This simplied the
analysis, since the rst mover's oer did not convey private information, while still allowing us to
illustrate the incentives that create an arms race. Intermediaries have private incentives to invest
in expertise as a deterrent in bargaining, even though it risks the social surplus generated by trade.
Our goal in this section is to show that these tradeos survive in the signalling game that
arises when expertise informs the actions of both the proposer and responder in any given trading
encounter. When the proposing party is informed, his oer inuences the beliefs of the responder,
and thus his willingness to accept. As is typically the case in such settings, there are many equilibria.
Our approach is to show, rst, that only pooling equilibria, where proposers with high signals oer
the same price as proposers with with low signals, support ecient trade. Second, we show that
in the trading subgame a pooling equilibrium exists in which the rst mover oers the same price
as he would if he were uninformed, and play proceeds as in the previous sections. The conditions
under which any pooling equilibrium exists restrict the level of expertise of the traders in terms
of the volatility and the ex-ante expected payos in the pooling equilibrium to the traders are the
same as in the subgame with an uninformed rst mover. They are linear and increasing in their
own expertise. Finally, we show that if play in the trading subgames proceeds in a manner in which
beliefs are \credibly updated," as dened by Grossman and Perry (1986), and in which gains to
trade are preserved through ecient trade whenever possible, traders will increase their expertise
in anticipation of this and volatility jumps will lead to breakdowns in trade, as in earlier sections.
7.1 The Trading Subgame
Again, we develop in detail the case where the rst mover wishes to buy, and the responding,
liquidity supplier takes the role of a potential seller. As should be clear from previous sections, this
is without loss of generality.
25Let sb 2 fH;Lg denote the buyer's signal and ss 2 fH;Lg that of the seller. We take as given
s = 1
2 + es and b = 1
2 + eb the probabilities, which increase with expertise, that the signals are
correct. We must now also consider the following quantities for the low-signal buyer,
 L
L  Prfss = L j sb = Lg
= bs + (1   b)(1   s) (23)
l
LL  Prfv = vl j sb = L;ss = Lg
=
bs
bs + (1   b)(1   s)
; (24)
and for the high-signal buyer,
 H
L = Prfss = L j sb = Hg
= b(1   s) + s(1   b) (25)
l
HL = Prfv = vl j sb = H;ss = Lg
=
s(1   b)
b(1   s) + s(1   b)
: (26)
It is straightforward to demonstrate the following result.
Lemma 1 The only equilibria in which ecient trade always occurs are pooling equilibria in which
the high-signal and low-signal proposers oer the same price, which is accepted by the seller.
Proof: Suppose there is an equilibrium in which dierent types of proposers oer dierent prices.
In such an equilibrium, for trade to be ecient, the responder needs to accept all of the proposer's
oers. If the proposer anticipates such a response, then he should oer the price that is favorable
to himself (lower if he buys, higher if he sells), regardless of his signal, a contradiction.
26The next question, then, is whether pooling equilibria that support ecient trade exist. We
rst construct a pooling equilibrium with very simple o-equilibrium beliefs. These beliefs are
agnostic, in that they treat any oer below the pooling price as equally likely to come from either
type of buyer. We use this case to illustrate the nature of pooling equilibria, and explain intuitively
why their existence imposes a bound on the level of expertise in terms of the amount of volatility
relative to the gains to trade. We then go on to provide a more formal analysis of ecient pooling
equilibria, where we focus on perfect sequential equilibria as proposed by Grossman and Perry
(1986). A similar bound on expertise must be satised for ecient perfect sequential equilibria to
exist in the trading subgame. This bound then serves as a basis for our analysis of the arms race
in expertise, and its potential to destroy gains to trade when volatility rises.
We conjecture an equilibrium of the following sort:
 Buyers of both types oer the lowest price at which the seller, knowing nothing about the
buyer's signal, would accept regardless of the seller's signal. This is, of course, the same price
buyers oer when they are uninformed, as in Section 2:
p = svh + (1   s)vl: (27)
 Sellers believe any oer of a lower price is uninformative, equally likely to come from either
type.
Given that both buyer types oer p, when the seller accepts he receives the same uncon-
ditional expected payo as he obtains with an uninformed buyer, which from equation (4) is
(vh   vl)
 
s   1
2

. Since the seller accepts this price regardless of his signal, the buyer learns
nothing about the seller's signal.
To verify that pooling at p is an equilibrium, we must check that it satises the participation
constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints for both the high- and low-signal buyers.
First note that satisfying the participation constraint for the low-signal buyer guarantees that the
participation constraint for the high-signal buyer is satised. Both buyers pay the same price for
the asset, but the expected value of the asset is weakly higher after seeing a high signal than a low
27signal. Also note that there is no incentive for either type of buyer to defect from the proposed
equilibrium by oering a price higher than p, regardless of the seller's beliefs. At best, the seller
would always accept, which he will do at p in any case, and the buyer will pay more. It remains,
therefore, to verify that neither buyer will defect to a lower price.
The payo to a low-signal buyer from oering p is:
E(v j sb = L) + 2   p = 2 + (vh   vl)(1   b   s)
= 2   (vh   vl)(eb + es): (28)
This payo needs to be at least zero for pooling at p to be an equilibrium. As long as the signals
are informative (positive expertise), the buyer must surrender some of his surplus to the seller to
induce him to accept the oer. With b = 1
2 and eb = 0, this is the same expression as we obtained
with an uninformed buyer, equation (3). The buyer's expected payo in this case is lower because
his signal is low, and he knows he is overpaying by more relative to the common value.
If the buyer oers a price p < p, the seller views this as uninformative about the buyer's signal.
The seller will therefore only accept the oer if his own signal is low, and will earn zero surplus.
Given this response, the buyer should oer the lowest price possible, which is p = E(v j ss = L).
Now, however, the probability that the seller accepts,  L
L, depends on the buyer's signal and its
precision, and the information conveyed by this acceptance conrms the buyer's signal. The buyer's
expected payo is therefore:
 L
L[E(v j sb = L;ss = L) + 2   p]
=  L
L[(1   l
LL)vh + l
LLvl + 2   (1   s)vh   svl]
=  L
L[2   (vh   vl)(l
LL   s)]: (29)
In this expression, the buyer loses surplus, conditional on a trade occurring, as long as both signals
are more informative than that of the seller alone. The buyer is overpaying ex-post, because the
seller's acceptance conrms his signal. As the signals become less informative, the buyer's payo
at this price approaches , as in the case of an uninformed buyer, equation (5).
28Comparing these payos, the low-signal buyer will not deviate to a lower price as long as
2 + (vh   vl)(1   b   s)   L
L[2   (vh   vl)(l
LL   s)]: (30)
Substituting for the conditional probabilities from equations (23) and (24), and for the signal
precisions, i = 1
2 + ei, we nd after some simplication that the condition above is equivalent to:
2
vh   vl

eb
2 + es + 2ebe2
s
1
2   2ebes
: (31)
Note that as expertise rises from zero to its maximum value of 1
2 the numerator on the right-
hand side of condition (31) approaches unity, while the denominator approaches zero. Thus, for
xed gains to trade relative to volatility, the incentive compatibility condition bounds the level of
expertise, as in equation (7) when the buyer is uninformed.
The next lemma shows that the incentive compatibility constraint in condition (31) is the critical
one. The proof is provided in the appendix.
Lemma 2 If pooling is incentive compatible for the low-signal buyer, and condition (31) is satised,
it is also incentive compatible for the high-signal buyer.
Also, condition (31) implies that the participation constraint for the low-signal buyer (and,
therefore, for the high-signal buyer) will be satised. To see this, we can rewrite condition (31) as:
2  
eb
2 + es + 2ebe2
s
1
2   2ebes
(vh   vl)  0; (32)
and since
eb
2 + es + 2ebe2
s
1
2   2ebes
=
eb + 2es + 4ebe2
s
1   4ebes
 eb + 2es + 4ebe2
s  eb + es; (33)
then the incentive compatibility for the low-signal buyer guarantees that both the high- and low-
signal buyers get a payo of at least zero. Thus, the only critical constraint on the parameters that
support a pooling equilibrium with ecient trade is given by condition (31). This constraint will
29be violated when volatility (relative to gains to trade) is too high or when traders' expertise is too
high.
Now consider the ex-ante expected payos to the buyer and seller from the trading subgame,
in the pooling equilibrium, before knowing their signals. The buyer receives 2   p plus E(v j
sb = H) or E(v j sb = L) with equal probability, or
2 + (vh   vl)

1   s   b
2
+
b   s
2

= 2   (vh   vl)es: (34)
Since trade always takes place, the seller receives the remaining surplus of
(vh   vl)es: (35)
Not surprisingly, since trade always occurs, and at the same prices as when the buyer is uninformed,
the ex-ante payos are the same. Agent i, then, before knowing whether he or his opponent, agent
j, is buyer or seller, earns an expected payo of
 +
1
2
(vh   vl)(ei   ej): (36)
Taking as given his opponents' levels of expertise, trader i will increase his expected payo in any
given trading encounter by increasing his expertise. The incentives to invest in expertise are similar
to those in the simpler case of one-sided asymmetric information.
To summarize, in an equilibrium preserving ecient trade in the trading subgame, where both
parties receive private signals, expertise plays the same role it does in the simpler setting analyzed
earlier. It deters opportunistic oers by the party initiating the trade, but the private incentives
agents have to invest in expertise are limited by an incentive compatibility condition, and this
bound decreases when volatility rises. Thus, just as before, investments in expertise made in
anticipation of ecient trade in the subgame could put gains to trade at risk if volatility jumps.
Notice, however, that for each agent the bound on expertise diers from the one derived earlier in
that it now depends on the opponent's level of expertise. For example, taking the seller's expertise
30level es as given, ecient trade will be possible in equilibrium as long as the buyer's expertise level
satises:
eb 

vh vl   es
1
2 + 2e2
s + 4
vh vles
: (37)
For a pooling equilibrium to exist, the buyer cannot be tempted to deviate from the pooling oer
p after receiving a low signal. But the expected payo the low-value buyer collects from playing
the pooling strategy will decrease in the seller's expertise (which increases the pooling price) and
also in his own expertise (which makes him even more sure that he will end up buying a low-value
asset).
There exist other pooling equilibria in the subgame that are based on dierent o-equilibrium
beliefs and that preserve the gains to trade. The next proposition shows that if we restrict players
to update their beliefs credibly, as in the denition of perfect sequential equilibria in Grossman and
Perry (1986), the only equilibria with ecient trade that survive in the trading subgame will be
pooling equilibria at a price of p. A perfect sequential equilibrium is described by Grossman and
Perry (1986) as an equilibrium \supported by beliefs p which prevent a player from deviating to an
unreached node, when there is no belief q which, when assigned to the node, makes it optimal for
a deviation to occur with probability q." Intuitively speaking, this concept ensures that, whenever
possible, the o-equilibrium beliefs associated with a deviation by the buyer are updated following
Bayes' rule given the best response(s) of the seller if he has such beliefs. The result will help to
restrict the behavior we should expect to take place when traders meet. There is at most one type
of pooling equilibria that is perfect sequential.2 Since the price oered in these equilibria is the
same as in the case with agnostic beliefs, equilibrium play will proceed as described above, and as
in previous sections with one-sided asymmetric information. We also derive the boundary for the
existence of an ecient, perfect sequential equilibrium in the trading subgame. Since the low type
buyer might nd protable to deviate to an oer slightly above E [vjss = L;sb = L] when the seller's
beliefs are credibly updated, the renement proposed by Grossman and Perry (1986) produces a
tighter condition than (31), which ensures pooling is an equilibrium with agnostic beliefs. The
2Formally, since beliefs will be unrestricted following certain o equilibrium path actions that are always unap-
pealing to both types, there are multiple equilibria, but they are outcome equivalent. We maintain the convention of
using uniqueness in this sense.
31proof of the proposition is provided in appendix.
Proposition 2 The only equilibria that involve ecient trade in the trading subgame and that are
perfect sequential as dened in Grossman and Perry (1986) are pooling equilibria at p. Such
ecient perfect sequential equilibria exist if and only if
2
vh   vl

es + eb
1
2   2eseb
: (38)
From the above expression for the threshold for the existence of a perfect sequential, ecient
equilibrium, we can immediately obtain the following results. First, there is a unique symmetric
expertise pair e =
vh vl
4
hq
1 + 42
(vh vl)2   1
i
that satises the above threshold with equality. This
expertise level is greater than zero whenever
vh vl
 2 (0;+1). Second, regardless of whether
expertise is symmetric, a slight increase in expertise by one player crossing this boundary implies
that the ecient, perfect sequential equilibrium ceases to exist, whether that player is a buyer a
seller. Finally, since the left-hand side of the condition in the proposition is decreasing in (vh  vl),
an increase in volatility eliminates the ecient, perfect sequential equilibrium where traders have
invested in expertise up to the boundary.
As before, the ex-ante payos to the agents, anticipating the pooling equilibrium in the trad-
ing game, before they know their roles as buyer or seller, will be the same as when asymmetric
information is one-sided,  + 1
2(vh   vl)(ei   ej).
7.2 Choice of Expertise
We now investigate the possible equilibrium choices for expertise at t = 0, assuming that the costs
of expertise are low and high-volatility states are rare. If all traders anticipate that in the low-
volatility regime play in the trading subgame will proceed according to a pooling equilibrium at p,
then their expected payos will be linear in their own expertise and they will invest in expertise.
However, at some boundary in expertise, any increase in expertise will prevent ecient trade from
taking place and will destroy some of the gains to trade. The equilibrium in expertise associated
with that boundary will involve ecient trade in low-volatility regimes and breakdowns in liquidity
32in the high-volatility regimes, regardless of the size of the jump in volatility, just as in the setup
with one-sided asymmetric information.
There will, however, be other types of equilibria. The multiplicity of possible beliefs and equilib-
ria in the trading subgame when both parties have private information induce multiple equilibria in
the choice of expertise. In these equilibria, play along the equilibrium path proceeds in the subgame
according to the pooling equilibrium, but additional investment in expertise is deterred by beliefs
about the opponents' strategic choices in response to an out-of-equilibrium increase in expertise.
Specically, suppose all traders have low levels of expertise. Any trader can then improve his
discounted expected payos by raising his investment in expertise as long as he anticipates pooling
equilibrium outcomes in the trading subgame (in the low volatility regime). An arms race will
then occur. If instead he anticipates that the response of his opponents to such an increase in his
expertise will be to play either the strategies associated with separating equilibria in the trading
subgame, which are inecient, or to play ecient equilibria that provides the non-deviating player
with a larger share of the surplus, the resulting decrease in his expected payo may be sucient to
discourage such a deviation from the lower, equilibrium level of expertise.
For this reason, we impose the perfect sequential equilibrium renement dened in Gross-
man and Perry (1986) on the expertise acquisition game and eliminate equilibria that rely on
o-equilibrium threats with incredible beliefs. We further require that players anticipate that, if
both ecient and inecient perfect sequential equilibria exist, the ecient equilibrium will prevail.3
We conne attention to the more interesting case where the costs of expertise rise suciently fast
above the symmetric point on the threshold so that large increases in expertise are too costly to
be protable. Formally, we will show that when both traders invest up to the symmetric thresh-
old e, neither trader has an incentive to deviate to a marginally higher level of expertise where
trade breaks down with positive probability. We also consider only the most ecient symmetric
equilibrium (that is, the equilibrium in which trade always takes place in the low-volatility state
and expertise investment is minimized). Under these restrictions, we obtain a unique prediction
for investment in expertise, and small, infrequent increases in volatility will lead to breakdowns in
3This restriction can be motivated by a strong form of forward induction closely related to the updating rule
imposed in Grossman and Perry (1986).
33trade in the high-volatility state.
Under the restrictions described above, investment up to the threshold that applies in the
low-volatility regime, i.e.,
e =

4
"r
1 +
42
2   1
#
; (39)
will be the unique prediction of our model if we can show that, for any expertise pair fei;ejg that
violates the threshold (38) in Proposition 2, a perfect sequential equilibrium exists and is unique
in a suciently small neighborhood of the symmetric expertise level e where the boundary in
(38) is violated by an increase in expertise. Note that uniqueness is not necessary but is sucient
to rule out a deviation above e. If there is a perfect sequential equilibrium following a small
deviation in expertise above e and that equilibrium is unique, then the deviator has to expect
lower payos than at e. This is because for a small deviation payos accrue almost symmetrically
to the deviator and non-deviator and total payos are discretely less than they would be if neither
player had deviated as trade breaks down with positive probability. If there were multiple perfect
sequential equilibria, it would be necessary to check whether one player could anticipate higher
payos following a deviation by expecting the perfect sequential equilibrium most favorable to the
seller when he is the seller or to the buyer when he is the buyer. Furthermore, if there is no perfect
sequential equilibrium, any sequential equilibrium of the trading subgame could be anticipated,
including those that are ecient but not perfect sequential. The next proposition establishes the
existence and uniqueness of the perfect sequential equilibrium slightly above e where the ecient
trading equilibrium does not exist, and thus completes the argument.
Proposition 3 The unique perfect sequential equilibrium in a neighborhood around (e;e) with at
least one ei > e, involves the following actions:
 The high type buyer oers ph  E [vjss = H;sb = H].
 The low type buyer oers pl  E [vjss = L;sb = L].
 Both seller types accept ph when oered.
 The low type seller always accepts pl when oered.
34 The high type seller always rejects pl when oered.
 Trade breaks down with probability 1
4   ebes, destroying a surplus of 2
1
4   ebes

.
To summarize, when the condition in Proposition 2 is violated, ecient trade cannot take place
in the trading game with low volatility if beliefs are credibly updated. Instead, trade takes place as
in Proposition 3,  H
L  of the gains to trade are lost, and the ex-ante payos to the agents before
they know their roles as buyer or seller, are smaller than if the condition in Proposition 2 is not
violated. So as long as the costs of expertise do not rise too quickly and the high volatility is not
too frequent, the equilibrium outcome of the expertise game that survive the credible updating
criterion of Grossman and Perry (1986) here will have traders investing in expertise up to the point
where any further investment would lead to breakdowns in trade in the low-volatility regime, as
in earlier sections where only the responder is informed. And as long as the costs of acquiring
expertise are not too at, we have shown that this is the unique prediction for expertise investment
in a symmetric equilibrium. Infrequent, small shocks to volatility will still lead to breakdowns in
trade.
8 Conclusion
The model in this paper illustrates the incentives for nancial market participants to overinvest
in nancial expertise. Expertise in nance increases the speed and eciency with which traders
and intermediaries can determine the value of assets when they are negotiating with potential
counterparties. The lower costs give them advantages in negotiation, even when the information
acquisition has no value to society, and even when it can create adverse selection that disrupts trade
if uncertainty about the volatility of fundamental values increases too quickly or unexpectedly to
allow intermediaries to adjust or scale back their investment in expertise. If jumps in volatility are
suciently infrequent, the gains to trade lost in the high-volatility regime will not be as important
as the increase in prots that added expertise, and the ensuing improved bargaining position, bring
in the low-volatility regime. The intermediary will nd optimal to acquire expertise that increases
expected prots in the more probable low-volatility regime, even though the advantage gained is
35neutralized by similar investments by counterparties in equilibrium, and even though expertise
decreases prots because of trade breakdowns when volatility jumps.
Some extensions to the model may warrant additional research. Financial expertise might also
allow intermediaries to decrease the precision of information acquired by their counterparties, as
well as increasing the precision of their own information. Investment in expertise permits rms to
create, and make markets in, more complex nancial instruments. In our notation, we can view
the precision of information about intrinsic value for agent i as (ei;ej), which decreases in i's own
expertise and increases in that of his counterparty. The logic of our analysis suggests rms benet
from increasing the relative costs of their counterparties. The tension between the incentives to
decrease others' signal precision, which would reduce adverse selection, and increase one's own
signal precision, which increases it, may help us better understand innovation and evolution in
nancial markets.
In our model, intermediaries invest in expertise only once, and the volatility states are drawn
independently through time. This illustrates the consequences shocks to volatility have for liquidity.
If volatility is persistent through time, and intermediaries can adjust, with some adjustment costs,
their level of expertise in response to changing volatility, then shocks to volatility will still lead
to breakdowns in liquidity, but they will also trigger contractions in \expertise" which can be
interpreted as employment of nancial professionals. Such a model might be informative about the
nature of employment cycles in nancial services.
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Symmetry of the trading game: The arguments in the text derive expressions for the case
where the proposer buys. If the proposer sells, the highest price at which he can ensure acceptance
of his oer for any signal is
p = E(v j si = L) (A1)
and his payo is
p   [E(v)   2] = 2   (vh   vl)

i  
1
2

= 2   (vh   vl)ei: (A2)
The highest price at which trade will occur at least half the time is
p = E(v j si = H) (A3)
and the seller's payo is
1
2
(p   [E(v j si = H)   2]) =  (A4)
Comparing these expressions for the seller's payo to those for the buyer's payos in the text reveals
they are identical. A comparison of the payos at price p and p then yields the same inequality
for the level of expertise.
Proof of Proposition 1:
If
1
2
(1   )  c0( e): (A5)
then
  1  
2

c0( e): (A6)
Noting that  e = 
 , this inequality follows from the rst terms under the minf;g operator in the
expression for  in the proposition.
This also implies, by the convexity of the cost function, and  e >   e the three following conditions:
1
2
[(1   ) + ] > c0( e); (A7)
1
2
(1   ) > c0(  e); (A8)
and
1
2
[(1   ) + ] > c0(  e): (A9)
Thus, we can rule out as candidate equilibria levels of expertise where the rst-order conditions
39hold with equality, ^ eh and ^ el, and focus only on whether agents will prefer  e which maximizes the
payo in the low-volatility regime, but leads to breakdowns in trade with probability 0.5 in the
high-volatility regime or they will prefer the expertise level   e which maximizes the payo without
triggering breakdowns in trade in the high-volatility regime.
Comparing payos from the two levels of expertise,  e will be preferred if:
1
2
(1   ) e   c( e) 
1
2
[(1   )  e +   e]   c(  e): (A10)
Notice that due to the convexity of c(), when we set  = 0 this inequality is satised and non-
binding whenever the inequality required for  e to be the equilibrium expertise level when  = 0
is satised, i.e., condition (18) in the Proposition. Thus, even if we allow for a small but positive
probability  of high volatility, the second term on the left-hand side of (A12) above will be small
and will not violate the inequality.
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by 2 yields:
(1   ) e   2c( e)  (1   )  e +   e   2c(  e); (A11)
which can be written as:
[ e     e]   2[c( e)   c(  e)]
[ e + (   1)  e]
 : (A12)
In summary, the following two conditions ensure that  e remains the unique equilibrium in
expertise:
1
2
(1   )  c0( e); (A13)
and
1
2
(1   ) e   c( e) 
1
2
[(1   )  e +   e]   c(  e): (A14)
And since both conditions are continuous in , then we know that if these conditions are not binding
when  = 0, they will not bind for small enough positive .
Combining these requires  < , where:
 = min

1  
2

c0( e);
[ e     e]   2[c( e)   c(  e)]
[ e + (   1)  e]

; (A15)
which, when substituting for the values of  e and   e, is equal to expression (19) in the Proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2:
For a buyer with a high signal, the expected payo from oering p, given that it is always
40accepted by the responding seller, is
E(v j sb = H) + 2   p = 2 + (vh   vl)(b   s)
= 2   (vh   vl)(es   eb) (A16)
The buyer may be overpaying or underpaying at p, depending on whose signal is more accurate.
The same buyer's expected payo if he oers p reects the conditional probability that the
seller has a low signal, which is required for him to accept a low oer, and the value of the asset
conditional on the seller revealing a low signal through his decision:
 H
L [E(v j sb = H;ss = L) + 2   p]
=  H
L [(1   l
HL)vh + l
HLvl + 2   (1   s)vh   svl]
=  H
L [2   (vh   vl)(l
HL   s)] (A17)
As before, this expression goes to  as expertise goes to zero, and the signals become uninformative.
Even at this lower price, the buyer may overpay conditional on trade occurring, depending on the
accuracy of his signal relative to that of the seller. This determines whether l
HL is less than or
greater than s.
Pooling will be incentive compatible for the high-signal buyer if
2 + (vh   vl)(b   s)   H
L [2   (vh   vl)(l
HL   s)] (A18)
Substituting from (25) and (26) for the conditional probabilities, rewriting the precisions in terms
of expertise and simplifying then yields:
2
vh   vl

(1   s)bs + 2
s(1   b)   s(1   b)   b + s
1   b(1   s) + s(1   b)
=
es   2e2
seb  
eb
2
1
2 + 2ebes
(A19)
The above will never bind if pooling is incentive compatible for the low-signal buyer. Comparison
of (A19) with the IC constraint for the low-signal type, (31), reveals that for 0 < es;eb < 1
2, the
denominator of (31) is always lower, and the numerator is always higher, than for (A19).
Proof of Proposition 2:
Here, we consider all the possible prices that could trigger an equilibrium with ecient trade in
the trading subgame and check if they can be sustained by beliefs that satisfy the credible updating
rule of Grossman and Perry (1986). Since a pooling equilibrium involves both types of buyers
oering the same price, the minimal price that a seller will always accept is p = svh+(1 s)vl.
Prices below p cannot sustain an ecient equilibrium in the subgame.
41Now, consider an ecient equilibrium with price p > p. Consider a deviation to some p0 2
(p;p). We compare the strategy-belief combinations for the seller. If the seller has a strategy of
rejecting p0 regardless of his signal, neither type of buyer will deviate from p, so the seller's beliefs
are unrestricted, but the deviation is unattractive. If the seller always accepts, both types of buyers
prefer to deviate and the seller's (credibly updated) posterior belief is that the deviation is equally
likely to come from both types of buyers. Given these beliefs, the seller's best response is to accept.
If the seller chooses to accept only when he is the low type, either only the low type buyer wants to
deviate to p0 or both types want to deviate to p0. Thus, the seller must believe that p0 comes from
the low type at least as often as from the high type, and therefore his best response is to accept
p0 with probability 1. Thus, both buyer types will deviate to p0 when beliefs are credibly updated,
and a pooling equilibrium at p > p cannot be a perfect sequential equilibrium in the subgame.
We now show that if the boundary in the proposition is violated, the buyer will have a protable
deviation when beliefs are credibly updated, and that if the boundary is not violated, there exists
perfect sequential equilibria with pooling at p. First, it is immediate that no type of buyers
will deviate to a price higher than p. Now, suppose the low type buyer deviates to an oer
innitesimally above E [vjss = L;sb = L]. Conjecture that this oer is accepted by the low type
seller and rejected by the high type seller. The low type buyer will prefer to adhere to the pooling
price p that is accepted by both types of seller only if:
2 + E [vjsb = L]   p   L
L2; (A20)
which can be rewritten as the threshold in the proposition.
If this condition does not hold and as conjectured the seller accepts the deviation when his signal
is low and rejects it when his signal is high, the low type buyer will prefer to deviate to the oer
(innitesimally above) E [vjss = L;sb = L]. If the high type buyer does not prefer this deviation
over oering the pooling price that is always accepted (which will be true around the threshold in
the proposition), then the credibly updated belief is that the deviation comes from the low type
only and the low type seller's best response is then to accept the deviation. This makes deviating to
an oer slightly above E [vjss = L;sb = L] protable for the low type buyer. And since neither type
of buyer can prefer to make an oer the seller always rejects, conjecturing that the seller always
rejects a deviation will not generate dierent credible beliefs. Hence, the only set of credible beliefs
in the case where the high type buyer does not want to deviate is that the deviation comes from
the low type only. If both the high and low type buyers prefer the low oer when only the low type
seller accepts, then there is some price above E [vjss = L;sb = L] such that the high type buyer
prefers to adhere to the pooling price when he expects the high type seller to reject and the low
type seller to accept, while the low type seller prefers to deviate. For any given possible deviation,
it is impossible for the high type buyer to prefer to deviate from the pooling equilibrium while the
low type buyer prefers to adhere. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that the increased
42payo for the deviation conditional on trade is identical for both players, but the probability of
trade is reduced more for the high type seller than for the low type seller. A deviation to this price
then implies that the low type seller must accept since the oer exceeds E [vjss = L;sb = L], so
the deviation is preferred by the low type buyer. Thus, if the posited condition does not hold, the
pooling equilibrium at p is not perfect sequential.
Now, if the condition in the proposition does hold, a deviation to E [vjss = L;sb = L] will not be
preferred by either type of buyer when expecting the seller to accept if and only if his signal is low.
Furthermore, it is immediate that no high type seller will accept an oer of p < E [vjss = H;sb = L].
Since the low type buyer does not prefer a deviation to E [vjss = L;sb = L] when only the low
type seller accepts, no type of buyer cannot prefer an oer of p > E [vjss = L;sb = L] when only
the low type seller accepts. Thus, credible updating does not restrict beliefs for deviations to
prices less than E [vjss = H;sb = L]. Thus, it remains to show that no deviation to a price p 2
[E [vjss = H;sb = L];p) is preferred by a buyer given that beliefs are credibly updated whenever
possible. For such deviation to be attractive to the buyer, we need the high type seller to accept
it with positive probability. If the high type seller always accepts the deviation, regardless of his
own signal, then both types have an incentive to deviate to p. And since p < p, the high type
seller will always reject given credibly updated beliefs. Therefore, the buyer cannot anticipate that
the seller will always accept, regardless of his signal. This leaves only the possibility that the high
type seller is indierent between accepting and rejecting the oer. Indierence implies that the
seller believes that the oer is more likely to come from the low type buyer than from the high type
buyer (since p < p). This is possible since the probability that the high type seller accepts can
be chosen to make the high type buyer indierent between adhering and deviating, while the low
type buyer strictly prefers to deviate. Given these beliefs, however, it is still a best response of the
high type seller to always reject the oer after the deviation, which makes deviating unprotable
for both types. The requirement for perfect sequential equilibria is that, whenever possible, beliefs
are credible following a deviation, and that the responding player plays some best response to
these beliefs, not necessarily the best response that generates these beliefs. So, the seller can reject
any price p 2 [E [vjss = H;sb = L];p) while updating his beliefs credibly. Thus, the threshold
presented is both necessary and sucient for a pooling oer of p to trigger a perfect sequential
equilibrium in the trading subgame.
Proof of Proposition 3 Because we conne attention to a neighborhood around (e;e), we
can evaluate all prices and payos at (e;e) and rely on a basic continuity argument for i = 1
2+ei.
For notational simplicity, we normalize 2 = 1, which is without loss of generality. We rst show
that the posited equilibrium is, in fact, a perfect sequential equilibrium.
We start by showing that, in any equilibrium with two prices (say ph and pl, where ph >
pl), the high type buyer must oer ph = E [vjss = H;sb = H] with positive probability. If ph >
E [vjss = H;sb = H], both seller types will sell regardless of their o equilibrium path beliefs, so
43pH cannot exceed E [vjss = H;sb = H]. If ph 2 (E [vjss = H;sb = L];E [vjss = H;sb = H]), then
the low-type buyer will never want to oer ph and the seller must therefore believe that the value of
the asset is E [vjss = L;sb = H] when his signal is low and E [vjss = H;sb = H] when his signal is
high. The seller thus strictly prefers to reject the oer when he is the high type and accept the oer
when he is the low type, given that E [vjss = H;sb = L] = E [vjss = L;sb = H] at (e;e). Thus,
ph must be either E [vjss = H;sb = H] or E [vjss = L;sb = H]. The buyer will prefer to make an
oer of E [vjss = H;sb = H] whenever
1 + E [vjsb = H]   E [vjss = H;sb = H] >  L
H: (A21)
Directly comparing the payo to each oer at (e;e) gives the condition:
1
2
 
2 + (vh   vl)2  
(vh   vl)3
p
1 + (vh   vl)2
!
>
(vh   vl)(2 + (vh   vl)2   (vh   vl)
p
1 + (vh   vl)2)
2
p
1 + (vh   vl)2
(A22)
which holds for all (vh vl) > 0. Hence, the buyer will prefer ph = E [vjss = H;sb = H] in the neigh-
borhood around (e;e). Since the high type seller can reject any oer below E [vjss = H;sb = H]
if he believes the oer only comes from a high type buyer, the posited equilibrium is conrmed
to be a sequential equilibrium. In order to check that it is perfect sequential, it remains to show
that there is no price the low type buyer can deviate to such that the seller is forced to update his
beliefs to accept when he is the high type.
Consider a deviation to a low price of pl0
2 (E [vjss = L;sb = L];E [vjss = H;sb = L]). The
high type seller will reject, regardless of his beliefs about the seller's type. Now, for pl0
2
(E [vjss = H;sb = L];E [vjss = H]), the high type seller will accept only if he believes the low
type buyer makes the oer suciently frequently relative to the high type buyer. If the high type
seller accepts with probability 1, then the high type buyer has an incentive to deviate to a low oer
and beliefs must be updated such that the oer comes from the high type with at least probability
1
2. The oer should then be rejected by the high type seller. Therefore, the high type seller cannot
accept with probability 1. If the high type seller mixes to make the high type buyer indierent,
dening h as the probability that the high type seller accepts pl0
, we need:
1 + E [vjsb = H]   ph =  L
H

1 + E [vjss = L;sb = H]   pl0
+  H
Hh

1 + E [vjss = H;sb = H]   pl0
: (A23)
Now we check if the low type buyer would prefer the deviation to pl0
over what he would get in the
44equilibrium we propose. Solving for h gives a payo to the low type buyer who oers pl0
of:
 L
L

1 + E [vjss = L;sb = L]   pl0
+ (A24)
 H
L
0
@
1 + E [vjsb = H]   ph    L
H

1 + E [vjss = L;sb = H]   pl0
 H
H (1 + E [vjss = H;sb = H]   pl0)
1
A

1 + E [vjss = H;sb = L]   pl0
;
while adhering to the equilibrium strategy of oering pl gives a payo of  L
L. Simple (but tedious)
calculations show that, around (e;e), the payo to the low type buyer from oering pl exceeds
the payo from oering pl0
. Thus, the deviation to pl0
must be assumed to come from the high
type, and must therefore be rejected. Deviations to prices above E [vjss = H] cannot come from a
low type buyer even if both seller types accept. Around (e;e), the buyer would prefer to adhere
to the low oer pl than deviate to E [vjss = H]. Thus, the seller can credibly commit to reject such
oers.
To summarize, if the high type seller rejects a deviation, such deviation cannot be preferred by
the low type buyer over the equilibrium strategy. If the high type seller always accepts a deviation,
then it becomes protable for the high type buyer to deviate, and beliefs should updated such
that the high type seller rejects, making the beliefs that support always accepting not credible.
Finally, if the high type seller mixes after a deviation, any frequency of accepting that makes the
high type buyer indierent between deviating and not deviating (which is necessary for the high
type seller to have beliefs that lead him to mix) makes the low type seller prefer to adhere to
pl = E [vjss = L;sb = L]. Therefore, the seller must believe the deviation comes only from the high
type and he rejects the deviation with probability 1. Since any o-equilibrium oer that is greater
or equal to E [vjss = H] can at best make the low type buyer indierent between adhering and
deviating, even if the oer is accepted by both types of seller after the deviation, this establishes
that the equilibrium posited is perfect sequential.
We have already shown that any perfect sequential equilibrium with two prices must rely on
a high price of ph = E [vjss = H;sb = H]. Hence, in order to establish uniqueness, we need to
consider all sequential equilibria where the low type oers pl > E [vjss = L;sb = L] or the high
type oers ph with probability less than one. First, consider any sequential equilibrium where the
low type oers pl > E [vjss = L;sb = L] (or the low type oers pl = E [vjss = L;sb = L] but the low
type seller mixes over accepting or rejecting pl). Consider an o-equilibrium oer innitesimally
above E [vjss = L;sb = L]. The set of buyer types that could benet from such a deviation is either
the low type or both types. Consider rst the case where only the low type benets. Then, the
low type seller will accept and the high type seller will reject. The low type buyer will prefer such
45deviation to oering pl but the high type buyer will not, since around (e;e):
1 + E [vjsb = H]   E [vjss = H;sb = H] (A25)
>  L
H(1 + E [vjss = L;sb = H]   E [vjss = L;sb = L]):
Suppose both buyer types prefer the deviation. From the expression above, we would need the
high type seller to accept the oer slightly above E [vjss = L;sb = L] with positive probability. But
the oer is below E [vjss = H;sb = L], hence the high type seller will reject an oer slightly above
E [vjss = L;sb = L] regardless of his beliefs about the buyer's type. The only consistent beliefs
following a deviation to an oer slightly above E [vjss = L;sb = L] are that such deviation can
only come from the low type and the oer will therefore be accepted by the low type seller with
probability 1, making the sequential equilibrium proposed not perfect sequential.
There remains one class of equilibria to check. There may exist sequential equilibria where the
low type buyer oers a price pl  E [vjss = H;sb = L] while the high type buyer mixes between pl
and ph = E [vjss = H;sb = H]. Both types of seller will accept the oer ph, the low type seller will
accept the oer pl and the high type seller will mix between accepting and rejecting an oer pl. In
any such equilibrium, the payo to the low type buyer for adhering is given by:
 L
L (1 + E [vjss = L;sb = L]   pl) +  H
L h (1 + E [vjss = H;sb = L]   pl): (A26)
The value for h is given by the requirement that the high type buyer be indierent between oering
ph and pl:
1 + E[vjsb = H]   E [vjss = H;sb = H] =  L
H (1 + E [vjss = L;sb = H]   pl)
+  H
Hh (1 + E [vjsb = H;ss = H]   pl):
Substituting the implied h into the payo function and noting that the payo for deviating to an
oer slightly above E [vjss = L;sb = L] is still  L
L in any perfect sequential equilibrium, it follows
that at (e;e) the low type buyer strictly prefers to deviate to the lower oer in anticipation of
the low type seller accepting.
Now, consider the possibility that more than two prices are used. By the same logic as above,
at least one of the prices oered by the low type must be E [vjss = L;sb = L]. But, for any price
oered by the low type above E [vjss = L;sb = L], an oer lower than this oer but slightly higher
than E [vjss = L;sb = L] will be accepted by the low type by the arguments above, and will be a
protable deviation. Thus, this cannot be a perfect sequential equilibrium.
Finally, in the perfect sequential equilibrium proposed in the proposition, trade breaks down
whenever the buyer receives a low signal and the seller receives a high signal. This takes place with
probability
 H
L
2 , which can be rewritten as 1
4   ebes.
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Figure 1: Bounds on . The plot shows the maximum value of the probability of the high-volatility
regime , against the increase in the volatility . For values of  below this bound, agents in the
model invest in expertise to the maximum level,  e, even though this leads to breakdowns in trade
when the high-volatility regime occurs. Figure is generated using a discount rate  = 0:9, ex-ante
gain to trade  = 0:2, a cost parameter  = 10, and a low volatility  = 1.
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Figure 2: Expertise as a function of ex-ante gain to trade . The plot shows the relationship
between the equilibrium level of expertise and the ex-ante gain to trade. Figure is generated using
a discount rate  = 0:9, a cost parameter  = 10, a low volatility  = 1, a jump in volatility  = 1:2,
and a probability of such jump  = 0:05.
48